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Selective Hard Compatibilism

Selective Hard Compatibilism

Chapter:
(p.149) 8 Selective Hard Compatibilism
Source:
Action, Ethics, and Responsibility
Author(s):
Paul Russell
Publisher:
The MIT Press
DOI:10.7551/mitpress/9780262014731.003.0008

This chapter discusses the compatibilist view that is focused on examining the nature of the capacities required for freedom and moral responsibility. The difficulty this view faces lies in the description of a plausible alternative theory which is more satisfying than the classical view that freedom is simply a matter of being able to do as one pleases or act according to the determination of one’s own will. To address this, many influential contemporary philosophers who subscribe to the compatibilist view have placed emphasis on developing an account of “rational self-control” or “reasons-responsiveness.” Reasons-responsive views have two key components. First, a rational agent must be able to recognize the reasons that are available to or present in the situation; second, an agent must be able to “translate” those reasons into decisions and choices which guide conduct.

Keywords:   compatibilist view, freedom, moral responsibility, rational self-control, reasons-responsiveness

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